Dividend policy, corporate control and tax clienteles: The case of Germany
AbstractThis paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. While the concentration of control does not have an effect on the dividend payout, there is strong evidence that the type of controlling shareholder matters as family controlled firms have high dividend payouts whereas bank controlled firms have low dividend payouts. However, there is no evidence that the dividend preference of the large shareholder has an impact on the dividend decision. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Financial Studies (CFS) in its series CFS Working Paper Series with number 2011/16.
Date of creation: 2011
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Dividend Policy; Payout Policy; Lintner Dividend Model; Tax Clientele Effects; Corporate Governance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
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