Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs
AbstractIn this study we examine dividends and chief executive officer (CEO) stock ownership as interrelated mechanisms that may be used to reduce agency costs. We find a significant nonmonotonic relation between dividend yield and CEO stock ownership. Our evidence shows that until the CEO becomes entrenched, increased executive stock ownership reduces agency costs and decreases dividend yield. Beyond that point, increased stock ownership increases dividend yield. Whether additional stock ownership can reduce agency costs depends upon the CEO's degree of control in the firm.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Finance Association & Southwestern Finance Association in its journal Journal of Financial Research.
Volume (Year): 17 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3 (Fall)
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- Andres, Christian & Betzer, André & Goergen, Marc, 2011. "Dividend policy, corporate control and tax clienteles: The case of Germany," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/16, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
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"How Relevant is Dividend Policy under Low Shareholder Protection?,"
2006-019, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2006. "How Relevant is Dividend Policy under Low Shareholder Protection?," Discussion Paper 2006-73, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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