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Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity

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Editor Info

  • McCahery, Joseph A.
    (Tilburg University)
  • Moerland, Piet
    (Tilburg University)
  • Raaijmakers, Theo
    (Tilburg University)
  • Renneboog, Luc
    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

Corporate Governance Regimes addresses corporate law's leading question: whether one or another corporate law regime possesses relative competitive advantage. To this end, the editors have brought together an international team of scholars in economics and law to critically assess the new theories of ownership and control which seek to explain the important efficiency advantages of dispersed ownership and the inevitable limitations of control-oriented systems of governance. Contributors describe and analyse the relative strength of the forces that shape the evolution of corporate law rules and practice. They also raise the issue of whether nations undertaking reforms should develop corporate governance policies that borrow from other systems' best practices, or pursue a course of internally designed corporate governance reforms. And, building on new theories of law and finance, they examine the incentives for introducing meaningful corporate governance reforms that disrupt or destabilize Europe's blockholding regimes. The collection is divided into seven parts. Part One provides not only a means for assessing the key features of market- and control-based systems of governance but a standpoint for determining whether national governance systems are likely to converge on a single, optimal system of governance. Part Two introduces the reader to the building blocks of European corporate governance and the securities law harmonization program. Part Three examines the complex ownership and control structures that are found in Western Europe, investigating the consequences of large shareholdings for minority investors. Part Four offers law and finance analyses of the relationship between legal and financial systems and corporate performance. Part Five looks at the economic perspective on the operation of the market for corporate control and the key legal rules and institutions of the bankruptcy and insolvency regimes in the USA and Britain. Part Six is devoted to exploring the economic effect of institutional shareholder participation in corporate governance in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The final section, Part Seven, evaluates empirically the executive compensation arrangements in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The contributions supply a pool of current research on the motivational effect of performance-related remuneration and the substantial increase in top executive remuneration in the USA. Contributors to this volume - J. McCahery and L. Renneboog W. Bratton and J. McCahery H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman J. Coffee M. Roe B. Cheffins K. Hopt T. Raaijmakers E. Wymeersch M. Goergen and L. Renneboog E. Boehmer P. Moerland I. Dherment and L. Renneboog W. Carlin and C. Mayer D. Lombardo and M. Pagano E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden M. Maher and T. Andersson C. Robinson, J. Rumsey, and A. White J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog J. Franks and W. Torous U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral L. Bebchuk R. Romano G. Stapledon and J. Bates M. Faccio and M. Lasfer M. Conyon and K. Murphy R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom

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Bibliographic Info

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This book is provided by Oxford University Press in its series OUP Catalogue with number 9780199247875 and published in 2002.

ISBN: 9780199247875
Order: http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199247875.do
Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199247875

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Web page: http://www.oup.com/

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Cited by:
  1. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2008. "Statute Law or Case Law?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2358, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Marc Goergen & Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Working Papers 05-19, Utrecht School of Economics.
  3. Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, 2004. "Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover Bids," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(1), pages 9-45.
  4. Correia da Silva, L. & Goergen, M. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2002. "When do German Firms Change their Dividends?," Discussion Paper 2002-056, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Marc Goergen & Miguel Manjon & Luc Renneboog, 2008. "Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 37-71, March.
  6. Pierre-Yves Gomez & Peter Wirtz, 2008. "Institutionnalisation des régimes de gouvernance et rôle des institutions socles:le cas de la cogestion allemande," Working Papers CREGO 1080601, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.

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