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A contractarian view on homann's ethical approach: The vision of "new ordoliberalism"

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  • Davies, Clem
  • Franke, Marcel
  • Kuang, Lida
  • Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard

Abstract

Homann's method is a sophisticated theoretical model. As a result, it contains a normative foundation upon which Homann bases his endeavor, as well as numerous conclusions following his positive analysis. We propose extensions to both the normative and positive aspects of Homann's theory in this article. On a normative basis, we recommend taking into account our approach of New Ordoliberalism. In addition to the prisoner's dilemma, we consider the moral dilemma of the hawk-dove game on a positive footing. Additionally, we also present an experimental design.

Suggested Citation

  • Davies, Clem & Franke, Marcel & Kuang, Lida & Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard, 2022. "A contractarian view on homann's ethical approach: The vision of "new ordoliberalism"," The Constitutional Economics Network Working Papers 01-2022, University of Freiburg, Department of Economic Policy and Constitutional Economic Theory.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cenwps:012022
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