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Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems

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  • Herreiner, Dorothea K.
  • Puppe, Clemens

Abstract

In the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of self-interest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying rationale for inequality aversion. Envy is a central criterion in the theoretical literature on fair division, whose definition (Foley 1967) differs from the more casual use of the word in the experimental literature. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems where the role of envy in Foley’s sense can be analyzed and compared to social preferences. We find that envy freeness does matter as a secondary criterion.

Suggested Citation

  • Herreiner, Dorothea K. & Puppe, Clemens, 2004. "Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 28/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:282004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
    2. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel," IEW - Working Papers 179, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Fehr, Ernst & Naef, Michael & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 30, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    5. Kritikos, Alexander & Bolle, Friedel, 2001. "Distributional concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 333-338, December.
    6. Herreiner, Dorothea K. & Puppe, Clemens, 2004. "Equitable Allocations in Experimental Bargaining Games: Inequality A version versus Efficiency," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 29/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2007. "Preferences over Income Distributions," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(2), pages 285-310, March.
    2. Herreiner, Dorothea K. & Puppe, Clemens, 2004. "Equitable Allocations in Experimental Bargaining Games: Inequality A version versus Efficiency," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 29/2004, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fairness; Envy Freeness; Social Preferences; Bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values

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