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Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: Evidence from an experimental coordination game

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  • Chmura, Thorsten
  • Kube, Sebastian
  • Pitz, Thomas
  • Puppe, Clemens

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 88 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 214-220

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:88:y:2005:i:2:p:214-220

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References

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  1. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  2. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Axel Ockenfels, . "Fairness Versus Efficiency - An Experimental Study of (Mutual) Gift Giving -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-40, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  3. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2004. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 857-869, September.
  4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Naef, Michael & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2004. "The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 30, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  6. Kritikos, Alexander & Bolle, Friedel, 2001. "Distributional concerns: equity- or efficiency-oriented?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 333-338, December.
  7. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  8. Dorothea K. Herreiner & Clemens Puppe, 2004. "Equitable Allocations in Experimental Bargaining Games: Inequality Aversion versus Efficiency," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse29_2004, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Abbink, Klaus & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995. "RatImage - research Assistance Toolbox for Computer-Aided Human Behavior Experiments," Discussion Paper Serie B 325, University of Bonn, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Stephan Kroll & Todd Cherry & Jason Shogren, 2007. "The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 411-428, December.
  2. Marianna Baggio & Luigi Mittone, 2014. "An experimental approach to generational heterogeneity," CEEL Working Papers 1404, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  3. Altmann, Steffen & Dohmen, Thomas & Wibral, Matthias, 2008. "Do the reciprocal trust less?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 454-457, June.
  4. James Bland & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2013. "Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  5. Raul Lopez-Perez & Agnes Pinter & Hubert Janos Kiss, 2013. "Does Payoff Equity Facilitate Coordination? A test of Schelling's Conjecture," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1346, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

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