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Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the Russian Federation

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  • Pyle, William

Abstract

This article explores the inter-relationship of collective action within the business community, the nature of the political regime and the security of firms' property rights. Drawing on a pair of surveys recently administered in Russia, we present evidence that post-communist business associations have begun to coordinate business influence over state actors in a manner that is sensitive to regional politics. A firm's ability to defend itself from government predation and to shape its institutional environment as well as its propensity to invest in physical capital are strongly related to both its membership in a business association and the level of democratization in its region. Of particular note, the positive effect of association membership on securing property rights increases in less democratic regions. The evidence, that is, suggests that collective action in the business community substitutes for democratic pressure in constraining public officials.

Suggested Citation

  • Pyle, William, 2007. "Organized business, political regimes and property rights across the Russian Federation," BOFIT Discussion Papers 18/2007, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofitp:bdp2007_018
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    Cited by:

    1. Kapeliushnikov, Rostislav & Kuznetsov, Andrei & Demina, Natalia & Kuznetsova, Olga, 2013. "Threats to security of property rights in a transition economy: An empirical perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 245-264.
    2. Andrei Yakovlev & Andrei Govorun, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 116, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    3. Jeffrey B. Nugent & Grigor. Sukiassyan, 2009. "Alternative Strategies For Firms In Oppressive And Corrupt States: Informality Or Formality Via Business Associations?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 423-439, October.
    4. Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2010. "Does the Rights Hypothesis Apply to China?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 629-650.
    5. Yakovlev, Andrei & Govorun, Andrei, 2011. "Industrial Associations as a Channel of Business-Government Interactions in an Imperfect Institutional Environment: The Russian Case," IWH Discussion Papers 16/2011, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    6. Libman, Alexander, 2008. "Federalism and regionalism in transition countries: A survey," MPRA Paper 29196, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Yakovlev, A. & Govorun, A., 2011. "Business Associations as a Business-Government Liaison: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 9, pages 98-127.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective action; property rights; political institutions; business associations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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