FDI, International Trade and Union Collusion
AbstractThis paper deals with firms’ decision related to international activities in a twocountry oligopoly model with a homogeneous product and unionized labor markets. Using a three-stage non-cooperative game with firms being first movers, it is found that firms’ strategies are affected by the scale of fixed costs of direct investments, trade costs and union wage strategies in labor markets, giving rise to different productive structures in equilibrium. Scopes and incentives for unions’ collusion are analyzed. The consequences on national welfare levels of both unions and firms’ strategic behavior are also investigated, deriving some policy insights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by FIW in its series FIW Working Paper series with number 050.
Date of creation: Jun 2010
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Postal: FIW Project Office Austrian Institute of Economic Research Arsenal Objekt 20 A-1030 Vienna
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Miklos-Thal, Jeanine, 2008.
"Optimal Collusion under Cost Asymmetry,"
11044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Naylor, Robin, 1998. "International trade and economic integration when labour markets are generally unionised," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1251-1267, July.
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