IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wsr/pbrief/y2021i050.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Handelspolitische Schutzmaßnahmen: Balanceakt auf einem schmalen Grat zwischen Schutz und Protektionismus

Author

Listed:
  • Julia Grübler

Abstract

Das oberste Ziel der Welthandelsorganisation ist eine globale Handelsliberalisierung zum Wohl aller Länder. Da der Abbau von Handelsbarrieren jedoch auch in nicht intendierten wirtschaftlichen Effekten resultieren kann, wurden bereits in den 1960er-Jahren Instrumente entwickelt, um Schäden für die heimische Wirtschaft durch stark steigende Importe – insbesondere jene, die unlauteren Handelspraktiken zuzuschreiben sind – entgegen-zuwirken. Antidumping-, Antisubventions- und Schutzmaßnahmen werden jedoch nicht nur multilateral im Rah-men der Welthandelsorganisation geregelt. Über 80% der seit 1996 in Kraft getretenen präferenziellen Handels-abkommen enthalten entsprechende Bestimmungen; in EU-Abkommen sind sie noch häufiger verankert als in anderen, allerdings mit wesentlich stärkerem Bezug auf die Welthandelsorganisation und die Erarbeitung ein-vernehmlicher Lösungen. Die empirische Wirtschaftsforschungsliteratur zeigt allerdings auch auf, dass die stark steigende Nutzung der Instrumente nicht zwingend ein Zeichen vermehrt unfairer Handelspraktiken ist, sondern vielmehr auf protektionistischen Missbrauch der Schutzmaßnahmen hindeutet. Die schweren wirtschaftlichen Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie, die durch die Krise beschleunigte Digitalisierung und die geographisch asym-metrische Erholung von der Gesundheits- und Wirtschaftskrise befeuern die Nutzung bestehender und Entwick-lung neuer handelspolitischer Schutzinstrumente. Neben der Beleuchtung von bereits seit längerem etablierten Antidumping-, Antisubventions- und Schutzmaßnahmen streift der Policy Brief auch neuere oder wiederbelebte Instrumente, die ebenfalls dem Schutz der Wirtschaft vor schädigenden Handelspraktiken anderer Länder die-nen sollen, aber die Diskussionen rund um steigenden Protektionismus und die Rolle der Welthandelsorganisati-on weiter intensivieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Julia Grübler, 2021. "Handelspolitische Schutzmaßnahmen: Balanceakt auf einem schmalen Grat zwischen Schutz und Protektionismus," FIW Policy Brief series 050, FIW.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsr:pbrief:y:2021:i:050
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Policy_Briefs/50_FIW_Policy_Brief_Gruebler_Schutzmassnahmen.pdf
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: none
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(1), pages 95-122, February.
    2. Thomas J. Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2021. "The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 11, pages 233-257, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Zanardi, Maurizio, 2006. "Antidumping: A problem in international trade," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 591-617, September.
    4. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "What explains the proliferation of antidumping laws? [‘Antidumping Laws in the US; Use and Welfare Consequences’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 23(53), pages 94-138.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
    2. Vandenbussche, Hylke & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2010. "The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 760-777, August.
    3. Peter Egger & Douglas Nelson, 2011. "How Bad Is Antidumping? Evidence from Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 1374-1390, November.
    4. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
    5. Jan Baran, 2015. "The impact of antidumping on EU trade," IBS Working Papers 12/2015, Instytut Badan Strukturalnych.
    6. Moore, M.O. & Zanardi, M., 2006. "Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization? An Empirical Analysis," Other publications TiSEM c0a19bf2-9849-4620-b109-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Anti‐dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 403-433, March.
    8. M. Mahdi Ghodsi, 2018. "Determinants of specific trade concerns raised on technical barriers to trade EU versus non-EU," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 45(1), pages 83-128, February.
    9. Christian Gormsen, 2011. "Antidumping with heterogeneous firms," Post-Print hal-00663024, HAL.
    10. Ian Wooton & Maurizio Zanardi, 2002. "Trade and Competition Policy: Anti-Dumping versus Anti-trust," Working Papers 2002_6, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Oct 2002.
    11. Laura Rovegno, 2013. "Trade protection and market power: evidence from US antidumping and countervailing duties," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 149(3), pages 443-476, September.
    12. Jozef KONINGS & Hylke VANDENBUSSCHE, 2009. "Antidumping Protection hurts Exporters: Firm-level evidence from France," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2009017, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    13. Christian Gormsen, 2011. "Anti-dumping with heterogeneous firms," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 125, pages 41-64.
    14. Kaz Miyagiwa & Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2016. "Accounting for Stylised Facts about Recent Anti-dumping: Retaliation and Innovation," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 221-235, February.
    15. Kokko, Ari & Gustavsson Tingvall, Patrik & Videnord, Josefin, 2017. "Which Antidumping Cases Reach the WTO?," Ratio Working Papers 286, The Ratio Institute.
    16. Chang, Yang-Ming & Raza, Mian F., 2023. "Dumping, antidumping duties, and price undertakings," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 131-151.
    17. Liza Jabbour & Enrico Vanino & Zhigang Tao & Yan Zhang, 2016. "The good, the bad and the ugly: Chinese imports, EU anti-dumping measures and firm performance," Discussion Papers 2016-16, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    18. Cheng‐Hau Peng & Hong Hwang & Kuo‐Feng Kao, 2023. "Is price undertaking a more friendly protection policy than an anti‐dumping duty?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 120-134, January.
    19. Mahdi Ghodsi, 2015. "Determinants of Specific Trade Concerns Raised on Technical Barriers to Trade," wiiw Working Papers 115, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw.
    20. Zanardi, Maurizio, 2006. "Antidumping: A problem in international trade," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 591-617, September.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsr:pbrief:y:2021:i:050. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.