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Moving costs, security of tenure and eviction

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Author Info

  • Alex Anas

    (State University of New York at Buffalo)

  • Richard Arnott

    (Boston College)

Abstract

We contrast equilibrium and welfare analysis in the rental housing market under two property rights regimes – eviction rights and security of tenure – when tenants face moving costs. A tenant’s idiosyncratic benefit from his unit and a landlord’s idiosyncratic profit from conversion are treated as private information. The two regimes differ when a tenant wants to stay in his unit but the landlord wants to redevelop it. North American housing markets have been characterized by eviction rights and many European housing markets by security of tenure. Under eviction rights, a landlord who evicts a tenant imposes a negative externality on him, which can be imperfectly internalized through a demolition (conversion) tax. Similarly, under security of tenure efficiency can be improved by subsidizing the moving costs of tenants.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/urb/papers/0408/0408005.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Urban/Regional with number 0408005.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 15 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpur:0408005

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 44
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Moving costs; eviction; tenure security; rental housing markets;

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  1. Anas, Alex & Arnott, Richard J., 1997. "Taxes and allowances in a dynamic equilibrium model of urban housing with a size--quality hierarchy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4-5), pages 547-580, August.
  2. Joseph Farrell., 1987. "Information and the Coase Theorem," Economics Working Papers 8747, University of California at Berkeley.
  3. Edin, Per-Anders & Englund, Peter, 1991. "Moving costs and housing demand : Are recent movers really in equilibrium?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 299-320, April.
  4. Eric A. Hanushek & John M. Quigley, 1978. "An Explicit Model of Intra-Metropolitan Mobility," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 54(4), pages 411-429.
  5. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 223-245, 01.
  7. Anas, Alex, 1997. "Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 111-37, July.
  8. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. Henderson, J. Vernon & Ioannides, Yannis M., 1989. "Dynamic aspects of consumer decisions in housing markets," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 212-230, September.
  10. Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, 1985. "Moving and Housing Expenditure: Transaction Costs and Disequilibrium," NBER Working Papers 1012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Dynarski, Mark, 1985. "Housing demand and disequilibrium," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 42-57, January.
  12. Rohan Pitchford, 2003. "Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 491-516, October.
  13. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Hashimoto, Masanori, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 475-82, June.
  15. Amundsen, Eirik S., 1985. "Moving costs and the microeconomics of intra-urban mobility," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 573-583, November.
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