Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice
AbstractApplying Weglorz' models of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social welfare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying "finite discrimination", if and only if in Weglorz' model there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9902001.
Date of creation: 02 Feb 1999
Date of revision: 01 Jun 2004
Note: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (2000) 46: 335-359
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Arrow impossibility theorem; anonymity; ecological welfare functions; axiomatic set theory; ultrafilters; Weglorz's models; permutation models;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-02-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-02-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-1999-02-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-1999-02-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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