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Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof

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Author Info
H. Reiju Mihara (Kagawa University)

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Abstract

This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function for countably infinite societies. The function is defined for those profiles such that for each alternative, the coalition that prefers it the most is gdescribable.h The gdescribableh coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra. The paper discusses oligarchical characteristics of the function, employing a specific interpretation of an infinite society. The discussion clarifies within a single framework a connection between the negative result (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) for finite societies and the positive result for infinite ones.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9604002.

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Date of creation: 24 Apr 1996
Date of revision: 20 Sep 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9604002

Note: Social Choice and Welfare (2001) 18: 543|553
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; cheatproofness; dominant strategy implementation; strategy-proof social choice functions; plurality rule; infinitely large societies; countable Boolean algebras of coalitions; free ultrafilters; models of knowledge; partitional information functions.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Lauwers, Luc & Van Liedekerke, Luc, 1995. "Ultraproducts and aggregation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 217-237. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
  2. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators," Public Economics 9705001, EconWPA, revised 07 May 1997. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. H. Reiju Mihara, 1994. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing Computability," Public Economics 9408001, EconWPA, revised 23 Aug 1994. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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