This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mihara, H. Reiju

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBY-3Y9TWFV-1/2/7179fa81c563eaa0d906ed8cd2e84d8d
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 267-287
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:32:y:1999:i:3:p:267-287

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. H. Reiju Mihara, 1997. "Arrow's Theorem and Turing computability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 257-276. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lewis, Alain A., 1988. "An infinite version of arrow's theorem in the effective setting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 41-48, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kelly, Jerry S., 1988. "Social choice and computational complexity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-8, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1994. "Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1085-1124, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Barton L. Lipman, 1993. "Information Processing and Bounded Rationality : A Survey," Working Papers 872, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  7. Pazner, Elisha A & Wesley, Eugene, 1978. "Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 85-91, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Spear, Stephen E, 1989. "Learning Rational Expectations under Computability Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 889-910, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Fishburn, Peter C., 1970. "Arrow's impossibility theorem: Concise proof and infinite voters," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 103-106, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Armstrong, Thomas E., 1980. "Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 55-75, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. H. Reiju Mihara, 2001. "Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 543-553. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Lauwers, Luc & Van Liedekerke, Luc, 1995. "Ultraproducts and aggregation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 217-237. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. H. Reiju Mihara, 2003. "Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games," Game Theory and Information 0310006, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara, 1999. "Arrow's theorem, Weglorz' models and the axiom of choice," Public Economics 9902001, EconWPA, revised 01 Jun 2004. [Downloadable!]
  3. Potgieter, Petrus H. & Rosinger, Elemér E., 2007. "Is Economics Entering its Post-Witchcraft Era?," MPRA Paper 3340, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.