Smallness of Invisible Dictators
AbstractFishburn (1970) showed that in an infinite society Arrow's axioms for a preference aggregation rule do not necessarily imply a dictator. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) showed that, in this case, nondictatorial rules imply an invisible dictator that, whenever the agent set is an atomless finite measure space, can be viewed as the limit of coalitions of arbitrarily small size. We show first that, when admissible coalitions are restricted to an algebra, there are two sorts of invisible dictators. We next show that, in most cases of interest, we do not need to resort to measures on the agent space to give a precise meaning to the statement that invisible dictators are the limit of arbitrarily small decisive coalitions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 0213.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision: Sep 2003
Preference aggregation; Arrow´s Theorem; Invisible Dictators; Ultrafilter Property; Strict Neutrality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C69 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Other
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