Suppose two agents play a game, each using a computable algorithm to decide what to do, these algorithms being common knowledge. The author shows that it is possible to act rationally provided he limits his attention to a natural subset of solvable games and to opponents who use rational algorithms; the outcome is a Nash equilibrium. Going further, the author shows that rationality is possible on many domains of games and opposing algorithms but each domain requires a particular solution algorithm; no one algorithm is rational on all possible domains. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)