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A Model Of Corruption In An Investment Project

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Author Info
Soumyen Sikdar (Dept. of Economics, Calcutta University, India)
Sarbajit Chaudhuri (Dept. of Economics, Calcutta University, India)

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Abstract

The present paper analyzes the phenomenon of corruption in the context of a Public Works Department (PWD) in a developing country city and examines its tenacity in the face of anticorruption measures. Different behaviour patterns of the supervisor (official) of the PWD have been considered. The interesting result to emerge is that corruption may show a high degree of robustness against marginal attacks and such measures may actually be counterproductive in the different cases considered in this paper.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0510/0510020.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0510020.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 23 Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0510020

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 12
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Corruption; investment project; supervisor; contractor; bribe; anticorruption measures;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 1996. "Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 433-449, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gupta, Manash Ranjan & Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, 1997. "Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 331-43, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1992. "Pervasive Shortages under Socialism," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 237-246, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Corruption," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 599-617, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 4372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
  8. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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