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Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Capacity

Author

Listed:
  • Sean Gailmard

    (Northwestern University)

  • John W. Patty

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

Abstract

In this paper we investigate how “civil service” personnel management interacts with bureaucratic discretion to create high capacity, expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We build a model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship specific) policy expertise, and may be either policy-motivated or policy-indifferent. We show that under specific conditions on the nature of expertise and bureaucratic discretion over policy choices, merit system protections for job tenure encourage the development of expertise and problem solving capacity in the bureaucracy. In addition, we identify conditions under which typical civil service rules encourage policy-motivated bureaucrats to enter and remain in public service, and policy- indifferent bureaucrats to leave it.

Suggested Citation

  • Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, 2005. "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Capacity," Public Economics 0502008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0502008
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 29
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0502/0502008.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    2. Bendor, Jonathan & Meirowitz, Adam, 2004. "Spatial Models of Delegation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 293-310, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bureaucracy; Expertise; Discretion; Civil Service;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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