Base Realignment and Closure: Guiding Principles for Peru
AbstractIn this paper, we examine the prospects for base realignment and closure in Peru and develop an initial strategy for the realignment and closure process. While previous research has focused primarily on the realignment and closure process in developed countries, we instead focus on the need for the realignment and closure process to complement the government’s objectives of democratic governance and economic growth. Given concerns about the reemergence of internal threats, most notably the Shining Path, and significant constraints on public finances, realignment and closure may have to proceed at a significant pace in the near term. We argue that transparency, accountability, and improved civil-military relations should not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0411001.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 05 Nov 2004
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Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
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Base Realignment and Closure; Peru; Defense Spending;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-22 (All new papers)
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