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Liability Rules and Evolutionay Dynamics

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Author Info
Mingli Zheng (university of Toronto)

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Abstract

We consider the convergence properties of behavior under a comparative negligence rule (CN) and under a rule of negligence with contributory negligence (NCN), assuming bilateral care with three care levels. Using an evolutionary model, we show that CN reduces the proportion of the population using low care more rapidly than does NCN. However NCN increases the proportion of the population using high (efficient) care more rapidly than does CN. As a result, the mean care level increases more rapidly and the mean social cost falls more rapidly under CN than under NCN.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/0312/0312001.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 0312001.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0312001

Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on win98; pages: 32. Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 157 (4) Dec 2001
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: tort law evolutionary game liability rules economic analysis of law

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K - Law and Economics
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Arlen, Jennifer H, 1992. "Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 411-26, April.
  2. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Wittman, Donald, et al, 1997. "Learning Liability Rules," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 145-64, January.
  4. ., ., 1997. "," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 127-127, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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