Economic Efficiency and Damage Awards in Personal Injury Torts
AbstractPast discussions about economic efficiency and personal injury torts have focused on the relationship between the optimal amount of care a potential injurer should take for economic efficiency. Typically this discussion has assumed that the economic damages are strictly monetary without any full consideration of how these damages should be measured. This paper constructs a general model which incorporates as an unknown the amount of monetary damages that an injurer should pay in the interest of economic efficiency. The optimal amount of damages need to be known to serve as signal for the amount of care a potential injurer should take. The model shows that the optimal damage award should be at that point where that marginal utility of money paid out by the injurer equals the marginal utility of the money received by the victim under his utility function after the accident and not considering any non-monetary damages.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 07-08.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
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Postal: Thelma C. Raley Hall, Boone, North Carolina 28608
Web page: http://www.business.appstate.edu/departments/economics/
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2007-05-19 (Health Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-05-19 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2007-05-19 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Economic Analysis of Accident Law,"
NBER Working Papers
9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert D. Cooter, 1991. "Economic Theories of Legal Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 11-30, Summer.
- Calfee, John E & Rubin, Paul H, 1992. "Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 371-411, June.
- Arlen, Jennifer H, 1992. "Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 413-29, June.
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