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Free Riders Among the Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions

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Author Info
Kara M. Olson (American University)

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Abstract

This research expands upon the current theoretical literature on the political economy of trade policy by empirically estimating the degree of rent-seeking in the presence of free riding. The results provide strong evidence that the level of trade protection awarded to industries is significantly influenced by political factors, including the number of firms that actively participate in a collective action. However, fewer firms participate in collective actions in industries characterized by either a large number of firms or high concentration levels because the free rider problem becomes more severe. I estimate a model of firm participation in antidumping petitions using a panel of U.S. petition filings and outcomes between 1980 and 1996. After estimating the parameters of the model, I simulate the impact of specific changes in U.S. antidumping law and find that even small changes in the private returns to participating in this rent-seeking activity will dramatically change the level of trade protection in the economy.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 0404009.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 29 Apr 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0404009

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: antidumping; rent-seeking; free riding; collective actions; trade policy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F1 - International Economics - - Trade
F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eric J. Bartelsman & Wayne Gray, 1996. "The NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database," NBER Technical Working Papers 0205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "Overcoming Free Riding: A Cross Country Analysis of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions," Working Papers 2009-01, American University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Aradhna Aggarwal, 2008. "Anti-dumping Protection: Who Gets It? An Exploratory Analysis of Anti-dumping Use in the Most Active User Countries," Working Papers id:1374, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kara M. Olson, 2004. "Subsidizing Rent-Seeking: Antidumping Protection and the Byrd Amendment," International Trade 0407005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.


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