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Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Nicholas Economides

    (Stern School of Business, New York University)

  • Giuseppe Lopomo

    (Stern School of Business, New York University)

  • Glenn Woroch

    (University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

We discuss the effects of strategic commitments and of network size in the process of setting interconnection fees across competing networks. We also discuss the importance of the principles of reciprocity and imputation of interconnection charges on market equilibria. Reciprocity means that both networks charge the same for interconnection. Imputation means that a network charges its customers as much as it charges customers of the other network for the same service. Assuming that each consumer cannot subscribe to more than one network, we begin by analyzing a game of strategic symmetry where the two networks choose all prices simultaneously. Second, we allow a dominant network to set the interconnection fee before the opponent network can set its prices. This results in a price-squeeze on the rival network. Third, we show that the imposition of a reciprocity rule eliminates the strategic power of the first mover. Under reciprocity, one network sets the common interconnection fee at cost, and the equilibrium prices for final services are lower than in the two previous games without reciprocity. Moreover, prices under reciprocity obey the principle of imputation. In the long run, consumers subscribe to one of the two networks. Typically, there is a multiplicity of equilibria, including corner equilibria, where all consumers subscribe to the same network. However, under reciprocity, there are no corner equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing," Industrial Organization 9701001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:9701001
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Economides, Nicholas & Salop, Steven C, 1992. "Competition and Integration among Complements, and Network Market Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 105-123, March.
    2. Nicholas Economides, 1997. "The Economics of Networks," Brazilian Electronic Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, vol. 1(0), December.
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    4. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Multiproduct Firms, Product Differentiation, and Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 1999. "Interconnection in Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
    2. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lim, Yoonsung, 2001. "An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 231-260, June.
    3. Carlo Cambini, 2000. "Competition between Vertically Integrated Networks: a Generalized Model," ICER Working Papers 01-2000, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives," UCLA Economics Online Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
    6. Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
    7. Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance," Industrial Organization 9612003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Yu-Shan Lo, "undated". "Market Shares, Consumer Ignorance and the Reciprocal Termination Charges," Discussion Papers 09/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. John A. Weinberg, 1999. "Interconnection and Rivalry between Banks," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-15, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2003. "Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 949-967, September.
    11. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2000. "Regulation of Access to the Telecommunications Network of New Zealand: A Review of the Literature," Working Paper Series 3931, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    12. Nicholas Economides, 2006. "Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction," Chapters, in: Dennis W. Jansen (ed.), The New Economy and Beyond, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. David Gilo & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit," Working Papers 03-05, NET Institute, revised Dec 2003.
    14. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2004. "Network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 611-631, May.
    15. Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities Concurrence et fusions entre réseaux avec externalités d’appels," Working Papers 0308, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    16. Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June.
    17. Baranes, E. & Flochel, L., 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 03.10.37, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    18. James J. McAndrews & William Roberds, 1997. "A model of check exchange," Working Papers 97-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    19. Gilo, David & Spiegel, Yossi, 2004. "Network interconnection with competitive transit," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 439-458, September.
    20. Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities," Post-Print halshs-00178580, HAL.
    21. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1997. "The check float puzzle," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 1-26.
    22. Edmond Baranes, 1998. "Réglementation et ouverture à la concurrence des activités en réseaux : le cas des télécommunications," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 13(4), pages 161-186.
    23. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, 2008. "Matching rules," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 57-70.
    24. Stefan Buehler, 1999. "A Further Look at Two-way Network Competition in Telecommunications," SOI - Working Papers 9904, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2000.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    two-way networks; interconnection; reciprocity; imputation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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