Price Competition in Segmented Industries
AbstractRepeated interaction between duopolists in a segmented industry is considered. The industry is fragmented into two separate segments. The duopolists compete in prices and segment choice, assuming that pricing strategies are completely flexible while segment choice is irreversible. Initially the two firms are located in different segments of the market, but they can choose to extend their operation to the other segment, operating in the whole industry. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium involving segment location and collusion in prices. The equilibrium path is further restricted by the magnitude of the fixed cost of entering the other segment, and by refinements on the equilibrium concept. Finally, the implications of the irreversibility of the entry decision are analyzed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 9308001.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 05 Aug 1993
Date of revision: 06 Aug 1993
Note: 23 pages, LaTeX file, titlepage.sty , epsf.sty, 3 figures Encapsulated Postscript, uuencoded, compressed and tarred.
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