A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games
AbstractThe model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) when the latter model's (fixed) mutation rate is equal to the expected mutation rate. A small population result corrects a minor omission in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9809002.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 14 Sep 1998
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - TeX (Scientific Workplace 2.5); prepared on COMPAQ PC; to print on HP Laserjet IV; pages: 14 ; figures: included
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varying mutation rate; risk dominance; coordination games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1998-12-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-1998-12-09 (Microeconomics)
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