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Problems of Evaluating Small Firms’ Quality as a Reason for Unfavourable Loan Conditions

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Author Info
Ingrid Groessl (HWP-Hamburger Universität für Wirtschaft und Politik)
Nadine Levratto

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Abstract

The article substantiates the hypothesis that the profitability of small firms is above all determined by qualitative variables. In this respect a low standardization of goods and even more importantly, the high significance of governance structures play a crucial role rendering the quality of the firm’s human capital, the flexibility of its machinery but also externalities of business networks, an appropriate integration of the family into business affairs as examples of qualitative information which also bear a high degree of privacy. Whereas the literature suggests relational contracts as a way how qualitative and private information can be credibly conveyed to the lender, it is shown that even in the German housebank-dominated financial system borrower- lender relationships of the kind recommended by the literature are hardly to be found. Rather, German banks, too, respond to information gaps with unfavourable loan conditions. As an alternative specialized information intermediation is briefly discussed.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Finance with number 0406014.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 24 Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0406014

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Small firms financing rationing information

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G - Financial Economics

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
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