A Field Experiment on Course Bidding at Business Schools
AbstractAllocation of course seats to students is a challenging task for registrars' offices in universities. Since demand exceeds supply for many courses, course allocation needs to be done equitably and efficiently. Many schools use bidding systems where student bids are used both to infer preferences over courses and to determine student priorities for courses. However, this dual role of bids can result in course allocations not being market outcomes and unnecessary efficiency loss, which can potentially be avoided with the use of an appropriate market mechanism. We report a field experiment done at the University of Michigan Business School in Spring 2004 comparing its typical course bidding mechanism with the alternate Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant market mechanism. Our results suggest that using the latter could vastly improve efficiency of course allocation systems while facilitating market outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Experimental with number 0407003.
Date of creation: 17 Jul 2004
Date of revision: 25 Feb 2005
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Other versions of this item:
- M.Utku Unver & Aradhna Krishna, 2004. "A Field Experiment on Course Bidding at Business Schools," Working Papers 258, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2004.
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
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- Yan Chen & Tayfun S�nmez, 2002. "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1669-1686, December.
- Franz Diebold & Haris Aziz & Martin Bichler & Florian Matthes & Alexander Schneider, 2014. "Course Allocation via Stable Matching," Business & Information Systems Engineering, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 97-110, April.
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