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Sustained Macroeconomic Reforms, Tepid Growth: A Governance Puzzle in Bolivia?

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Kaufmann

    (The World Bank)

  • Massimo Mastruzzi

    (The World Bank)

  • Diego Zavaleta

    (The World Bank)

Abstract

We are increasingly cognizant of the limits to large cross-country empirical studies in trying to understand in-depth a particular country reality, in ways useful for advice. At the same time, merely relying on a single country account at a particular point in time ignores the historical and comparative cross-country perspective. Worse, an in-depth investigation of a single issue within a country begs the question of whether such particular issue may be fundamental for the country's growth and development relative to other determinants, or not. Further, drawbacks exist from excessive reliance on narrow empirical approaches, or on mere qualitative narrative. Consequently, the approach undertaken here for the case of Bolivia is of an integrated nature, combining the following strands: i) an historical perspective from the twin standpoints of the evolution of the enterprise and government sectors over the past half century; ii) an in-depth review of the literature on explanations of Bolivia's performance; iii) an empirical analysis of the country's enterprise sector performance on the basis of a detailed firm- level survey conducted recently in 80 countries, and, iv) an empirical analysis of Bolivia's public agencies based on a survey of public officials in Bolivia working in over 100 institutions. To provide an additional element of comparability, we also utilize cross-country governance indicators.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Kaufmann & Massimo Mastruzzi & Diego Zavaleta, 2003. "Sustained Macroeconomic Reforms, Tepid Growth: A Governance Puzzle in Bolivia?," Development and Comp Systems 0308003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0308003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2007. "Inequality and Institutions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(3), pages 454-465, August.
    2. Stephan Klasen & Melanie Grosse & Rainer Thiele & Jann Lay & Julius Spatz & Manfred Wiebelt, 2004. "Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth - Country Case Study: Bolivia," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 101, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
    3. William Easterly, 2002. "The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 223-250.
    4. Daniel Kaufmann & Frannie Leautier & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2004. "Governance and the City: An Empirical Exploration into Global Determinants of Urban Performance," Urban/Regional 0405004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Stephan Klasen, 2006. "Macroeconomic Policy and Pro-Poor Growth in Bolivia," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 143, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Coslovsky, Salo V., 2014. "Economic Development without Pre-Requisites: How Bolivian Producers Met Strict Food Safety Standards and Dominated the Global Brazil-Nut Market," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 32-45.
    7. World Bank, 2005. "Bolivia : Country Economic Memorandum, Policies to Improve Growth and Employment," World Bank Publications - Reports 8399, The World Bank Group.
    8. Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2006. "Growth and Reforms in Latin America: A Survey of Facts and Arguments," IMF Working Papers 2006/210, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2004. "La desigualdad y las instituciones," Research Department Publications 4362, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; corruption; indicators; firms; Bolivia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O5 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • N16 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Latin America; Caribbean
    • P5 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems

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