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The quality of bureaucracy and capital account policies

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Author Info
Bai, Chong-en
Wei, Shang-Jin

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Abstract

The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. The authors propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital control. In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods. Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls. The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2575.

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Date of creation: 31 Mar 2001
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2575

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Related research
Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform; Governance Indicators; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; National Governance;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kaufman, Daniel & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does"grease money"speed up the wheels of commerce?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2254, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alesina, Alberto F & Grilli, Vittorio & Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 1993. "The Political Economy of Capital Controls," CEPR Discussion Papers 793, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Wyplosz, Charles, 1986. "Capital controls and balance of payments crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 167-179, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Natalia T. Tamirisa, 1999. "Exchange and Capital Controls as Barriers to Trade," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 46(1), pages 4. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  8. Bartolini, Leonardo & Drazen, Allan, 1997. "Capital-Account Liberalization as a Signal," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 138-54, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Fischer, S. & Cooper, R.N. & Dornbusch, R. & Garber, P.M. & Massad, C. & Polak, J.J. & Rodrik, D. & Tarapore, S.S., 1998. "Should the IMF Pursue Capital-Account Convertibility?," Princeton Essays in International Economics 207, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  10. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, 1999. "Short-Term Capital Flows," NBER Working Papers 7364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Shang-Jin Wei, 1997. "How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 63, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Chong-En Bai & David D. Li & Yingyi Qian & Yijiang Wang, 1999. "Limiting Government Predation Through Anonymous Banking: A Theory with Evidence from China," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 275, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
  14. Giovannini, Alberto & de Melo, Martha, 1993. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 953-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Shang-Jin Wei, 2000. "Corruption, composition of capital flows, and currency crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2429, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. R. B. Johnston & Natalia T. Tamirisa, 1998. "Why Do Countries Use Capital Controls?," IMF Working Papers 98/181, International Monetary Fund.
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  1. Axel Dreher & Lars-H. Siemers, 2009. "The nexus between corruption and capital account restrictions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 245-265, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Heinrich Ursprung, 2008. "The impact of globalization on the composition of government expenditures: Evidence from panel data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 263-292, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. von Hagen, Jürgen & Zhou, Jizhong, 2006. "The Interaction Between Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Regimes: Evidence from Developing Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 5537, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Morisset, Jacques & Lumenga Neso, Olivier, 2002. "Administrative barriers to foreign investment in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2848, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Axel Dreher & Lars Siemers, 2005. "The Intriguing Nexus between Corruption and Capital Account Restrictions," KOF Working papers 05-113, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Daniel Kaufmann & Massimo Mastruzzi & Diego Zavaleta, 2003. "Sustained Macroeconomic Reforms, Tepid Growth: A Governance Puzzle in Bolivia?," Development and Comp Systems 0308003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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