Allocative inefficiencies resulting from subsidies to agricultural electricity use : an illustrative model
AbstractThis paper provides an analytical discussion of several interconnected resource allocation problems from under-pricing of electricity used by farmers for groundwater extraction. In these situations, groundwater extraction is inefficiently high even without electricity under-pricing. Moreover, part of the electric power supply intended for farmers is often diverted to other unauthorized uses (notably illicit consumption). The paper demonstrates that unless non-price electricity rationing imposes severe constraints on demand, the range of resource allocation problems includes insufficient incentives to provide high-level service by the power utility, insufficient incentives for farmers to install and operate efficient equipment, and losses due to political"rent seeking"activities to influence water allocations. It also shows that diversion of electricity to illicit uses can increase overall economic efficiency when this leads to less electricity use by farmers, thus somewhat ameliorating the problem of excessive groundwater extraction as well as the inefficiencies related to under-pricing of electricity. Systemic reforms for overcoming these problems may face severe political obstacles.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 5955.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Energy Production and Transportation; Water and Industry; Economic Theory&Research; Wastewater Treatment; Electric Power;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2012-02-01 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2012-02-01 (Energy Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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