Airport slot allocation in Europe: economic efficiency and fairness
AbstractWe propose a mechanism for solving the airport slot allocation problem in Europe. We consider the interdependence of the slots at different airports, and we maximize the efficiency of the system. Through an experimental analysis we quantitatively assess the cost imposed by grandfather rights, which constitute one of the main principles of the current slot allocation mechanism. Moreover, we introduce the possibility to fairly redistribute costs among airlines through monetary compensations. Our results suggest that it is possible to remove grandfather rights without significantly penalizing airlines.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia in its series Working Papers with number 197.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Air Traffic Management; Airport slot allocation; Compensation mechanism; SESAR.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-EUR-2010-06-18 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-EXP-2010-06-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-URE-2010-06-18 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Paola Pellegrini & Lorenzo Castelli & Raffaele Pesenti, 2011. "Metaheuristic algorithms for the simultaneous slot allocation problem," Working Papers 9, Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia.
- Alessandro Avenali & Tiziana D'Alfonso & Claudio Leporelli & Giorgio Matteucci & Alberto Nastasi & Pierfrancesco Reverberi, 2014. "A supervised market mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-03, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".
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