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A Slot-Scheduling Mechanism at Congested Airports that Incorporates Efficiency, Fairness, and Airline Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Jamie Fairbrother

    (Centre for Transport and Logistics, Department of Management Science, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom)

  • Konstantinos G. Zografos

    (Centre for Transport and Logistics, Department of Management Science, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom)

  • Kevin D. Glazebrook

    (Centre for Transport and Logistics, Department of Management Science, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University, Lancaster LA1 4YX, United Kingdom)

Abstract

Congestion is a problem at airports where capacity does not meet demand. At many such airports, airlines must request time slots for the purpose of landing or take off. Given the imbalance between demand and capacity, slot requests cannot always be scheduled as requested. The difference between the requested and allocated time slots is called displacement. Minimization of the total displacement is a key slot-scheduling objective and expresses the efficiency of the slot-scheduling process. Additionally, fairness has been proposed as a slot-scheduling criterion. Fairness relates to the allocation of the total schedule displacement among the various airlines. Single- and multiobjective models have been proposed for slot scheduling. However, currently the literature lacks models that incorporate the preferences of airlines regarding the allocation of displacement to their flights. This paper proposes a two-stage mechanism for the scheduling of slots at congested airports. The proposed mechanism considers efficiency and fairness objectives and incorporates the preferences of airlines in allocating the total displacement associated with the flights of each airline. The first stage of the mechanism constructs a reference schedule that is fair to the participating airlines. In the second stage, the airlines specify how the displacement allocated to them in the reference schedule should be distributed among their requests. The mechanism then adjusts the fair reference schedule to meet as many of these preferences as possible. The development and implementation of the proposed slot-scheduling mechanism is demonstrated using real data from a coordinated airport and simulated displacement preference data. The proposed slot-scheduling mechanism provides useful information to decision makers regarding the equity–efficiency trade-off and enhances the transparency and acceptability of the slot-scheduling outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Jamie Fairbrother & Konstantinos G. Zografos & Kevin D. Glazebrook, 2020. "A Slot-Scheduling Mechanism at Congested Airports that Incorporates Efficiency, Fairness, and Airline Preferences," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(1), pages 115-138, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ortrsc:v:54:y:2020:i:1:p:115-138
    DOI: 10.1287/trsc.2019.0926
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Dixit, Aasheesh & Choi, Tsan-Ming & Kumar, Patanjal & Jakhar, Suresh K., 2024. "Roles of reciprocity and fairness concerns in airline-airport systems with environmental considerations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 312(3), pages 1011-1023.
    3. Wen, Xin & Sun, Xuting & Sun, Yige & Yue, Xiaohang, 2021. "Airline crew scheduling: Models and algorithms," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    4. Pouget, Lilian & Ribeiro, Nuno Antunes & Odoni, Amedeo R. & Antunes, António Pais, 2023. "How do airlines react to slot displacements? Evidence from a major airport," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    5. Liu, Wenjing & Zhao, Qiuhong & Delahaye, Daniel, 2022. "Research on slot allocation for airport network in the presence of uncertainty," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).

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