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Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions

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Author Info
Elisabeth Gugl () (Department of Economics, University of Victoria)
Abstract

Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but cardinality of the agents' utility functions precludes transferable utility. I show that both agents either benefit or lose with any change of production possibilities under the Nash Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Victoria in its series Department Discussion Papers with number 0702.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 09 Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:vic:vicddp:0702

Note: ISSN 1914-2838
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Related research
Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining resource monotonicity transferable utility risk aversion

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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  1. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1988. "Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 11-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bergstrom, Theodore C. & Varian, Hal R., 1985. "When do market games have transferable utility?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 222-233, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Ted Bergstrom & Richard Cornes, 1983. "Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1983B, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-59, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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