An overlapping-generations model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented. Education enhances productivity, but needs to be financed by borrowing. Because of the possibility of default, lenders may ration credit. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with and without credit constraints and show that credit constraints are associated with lower education and a lower real interest rate. We then study the role of public policy in remedying the inefficiency which occurs with credit market imperfections and examine whether public education can improve on the constrained equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University in its series Working Papers with number
0133.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
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John Hassler & José Rodríguez Mora & Joseph Zeira, 2007.
"Inequality and mobility,"
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Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 235-259, September.
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Other versions:
Hassler, John & Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente & Zeira, Joseph, 2000.
"Inequality and Mobility,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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John Hassler & Jose V. Rodriguez Mora & Joseph Zeira, 2007.
"Inequality and Mobility,"
ESE Discussion Papers
165, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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Hassler, John & Rodriguez Mora, Jose V. & Zeira, Joseph, 2002.
"Inequality and Mobility,"
Working Paper Series
rwp02-009, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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