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Patent-secret mix in complex product firms

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Author Info
Cugno Franco () (University of Turin)
Ottoz Elisabetta () (University of Turin)

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Abstract

Different protection mechanisms may be employed at the same time for a given innovation when the innovation is comprised of separately protectable components. If patents and trade secrets can be mixed in protecting single innovations, a trengthening in patent breadth may induce a lower level of patenting, as innovators are more prone to rely on secrecy.

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File URL: http://www.de.unito.it/web/member/segreteria/WP/2007/7_WP_Ottoz_Cugno.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Turin in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 200707.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uto:dipeco:200707

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Cohen, Wesley M. & Goto, Akira & Nagata, Akiya & Nelson, Richard R. & Walsh, John P., 2002. "R&D spillovers, patents and the incentives to innovate in Japan and the United States," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(8-9), pages 1349-1367, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  5. James Bessen, 2004. "Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies," Working Papers 0401, Research on Innovation. [Downloadable!]
  6. Nisvan Erkal, 2004. "On the Interaction between Patent Policy and Trade Secret Policy," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 37(4), pages 427-35, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1988. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 862, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Vincenzo Denicolo, 2007. "Do patents over-compensate innovators?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 22, pages 679-729, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Denicolo, Vincenzo & Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 2003. "The contract theory of patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 365-380, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ashish Arora, 1996. "Patents, Licensing, And Market Structure In The Chemical Industry," Industrial Organization 9605003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ottoz Elisabetta & Cugno Franco, 2008. "Hybrid licensing of product innovations," Department of Economics Working Papers 200810, University of Turin. [Downloadable!]
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