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Elite Collective Agency and the State

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  • Korkut Alp Erturk

Abstract

The paper explores how elites can develop capacity for collective agency through coordination. Elites challenge is to simultaneously deter the state from abusing power while at the same time relying on it to discipline defectors in their midst. The basic insight holds that the credibility of the states threats depends on the cost of carrying them out, which elites can have control over if they can act in tandem. Elites can coordinate in being compliant when the rulers threats serve their collective interest which raises the threats credibility, while lowering that of those they dislike by their coordinated noncompliance making them costly to carry out.

Suggested Citation

  • Korkut Alp Erturk, 2019. "Elite Collective Agency and the State," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2019_04, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:uta:papers:2019_04
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    File URL: https://economics.utah.edu/research/publications/2019-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    elite collective agency; state power; coordination; credible threats; subgame imperfect equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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