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Market power in California’s water market

Author

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  • Tomori, Françeska
  • Ansink, Erik
  • Houba, Harold
  • Hagerty, Nick
  • Bos, Charles

Abstract

We estimate market power in California’s thin water market. Market frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California’s water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited. Keywords: Water markets, Market power, California, Cournot-Nash. JEL classification: C72, D43, Q25

Suggested Citation

  • Tomori, Françeska & Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold & Hagerty, Nick & Bos, Charles, 2021. "Market power in California’s water market," Working Papers 2072/534854, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/534854
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yukihiko Funaki & Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova, 2020. "Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 525-546, June.
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    6. Ellen M. Bruno & Richard J. Sexton, 2020. "The Gains from Agricultural Groundwater Trade and the Potential for Market Power: Theory and Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(3), pages 884-910, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harold Houba & Françeska Tomori, 2023. "Stackelberg Social Equilibrium in Water Markets," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-9, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Aigua--Preus; 338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió; control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

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