Water Allocation Under Distribution Losses: Comparing Alternative Institutions
AbstractThe distribution of water resources is characterized by increasing returns to scale. Distribution systems link water generation to its end-use. Standard economic analysis overlooks the interaction among these micro-markets - generation, distribution and end-use. We compare water allocation when there is market power in each micro-market. These outcomes are compared with benchmark cases - social planning and a competitive business-as-usual regime. Simulations suggest that institutions with market power in generation and end-use generate significantly higher welfare than the distribution monopoly and the competitive regime. However, if the policy goal is to maximize the size of the grid, a distribution monopoly is preferred.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Alberta, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2009-8.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2009
Date of revision:
infrastructure; market power; spatial models; vertical integration; water markets;
Other versions of this item:
- Chakravorty, Ujjayant & Hochman, Eithan & Umetsu, Chieko & Zilberman, David, 2009. "Water allocation under distribution losses: Comparing alternative institutions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 463-476, February.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-22 (All new papers)
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