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The “kill zone”: copying, acquisition and start-ups’ direction of innovation

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Abstract

An incumbent monopolist may prevent a firm which currently sells a complementary product from developing a substitute, by copying its product. Imitation reduces the potential rival's current profits, making it less likely for it to obtain funding in the financial market. The anticipation of the incumbent's aggressive behaviour may also create an "ex ante" effect, by inducing the rival not to challenge the incumbent with a substitute (that is, not to enter the "kill zone") and develop another complement instead. Further, in this case the incumbent will have an incentive not to copy, since a new complement will raise its rents. The possibility of being acquired by the incumbent tends to push the rival towards developing a substitute rather than a complement. By choosing the former, potential gains from the acquisition are created (in the form of suppression of competition): as long as the rival has some bargaining power in the determination of the takeover price, it will then benefit from entering the "kill zone".

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Motta & Sandro Shelegia, 2021. "The “kill zone”: copying, acquisition and start-ups’ direction of innovation," Economics Working Papers 1780, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1780
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilbert, Richard J. & Katz, Michael L., 2022. "Dynamic merger policy and pre-merger product choice by an entrant," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Fumagalli, Chiara & Motta, Massimo & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2022. "Shelving or developing? Optimal policy for mergers with potential competitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 15113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta & Emanuele Tarantino, 2020. "Shelving or developing? The acquisition of potential competitors under financial constraints," Economics Working Papers 1735, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    4. Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs & Ulrich Wohak, 2023. "Start-up Acquisitions, Venture Capital and Innovation: A Comparative Study of Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp340, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    innovation; copying; Platforms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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