Corruption: A Corporate Perspective
AbstractThis paper offers a framework within which the corporate’ corruption may be analyzed and a comprehensive road map to understand the role played by corporation on corruption. Despite corruption is a field with a long tradition and a common topic of many researches, disagreements persist about definitions, causes, consequences and policies. Divergences are specially wide in relations with the role played by corporations. This article realizes a literature review about relationship between corporation and corruption, showing causes of discrepancies and it explains and justifies the differences adding to classical explicative elements —legality and efficiency—, the alignment and the principal-agent problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra in its series Faculty Working Papers with number 11/05.
Length: 50 pages pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.unav.es/facultad/econom
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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