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Who is Afraid of the Friedman Rule?

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Author Info
Joseph H. Haslag () (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia)
Joydeep Bhattacharya
Antoine Martin
Rajesh Singh

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the connection between optimal monetary policy and heterogeneity among agents. We study a standard monetary economy with two types of agents in which the stationary distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate. Sans type-specific fiscal policy, we show that the zero-nominal-interest rate policy (the Friedman rule) does not maximize type-specific welfare; it may not maximize aggregate social welfare either. Indeed, one or, more surprisingly, both types may benefit if the central bank deviates from the Friedman rule. Our results suggest a positive explanation for why central banks around the world do not implement the Friedman rule.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0421.

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Length: 29 pgs.
Date of creation: 21 Dec 2004
Date of revision: 21 Dec 2004
Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0421

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Related research
Keywords: Friedman rule; monetary policy; money-in-the-utility-function;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Gahvari, Firouz, 1988. "Lump-sum taxation and the superneutrality and optimum quantity of money in life cycle growth models," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 339-367, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. David K. Levine, 1991. "Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 43, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Correia, Maria Isabel Horta & Teles, Pedro, 1996. "Is the Friedman Rule Optimal When Money is an Intermediate Good?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Peter Ireland, 2005. "The liquidity trap, the real balance effect, and the Friedman rule," Working Papers 05-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Levine, David K., 1991. "Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 148-164, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1993. "Optimality of the Friedman Rule in Economies with Distorting Taxes," NBER Working Papers 4443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Edward J. Green & Ruilin Zhou, 2002. "Money as a mechanism in a Bewley economy," Working Paper Series WP-02-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Greenwood, Jeremy & Hercowitz, Zvi & Huffman, Gregory W, 1988. "Investment, Capacity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 402-17, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Erosa, Andres & Ventura, Gustavo, 2002. "On inflation as a regressive consumption tax," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 761-795, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Beatrix Paal & Bruce D. Smith, 2001. "The sub-optimality of the Friedman rule and the optimum quantity of money," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0113, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  11. Feenstra, Robert C., 1986. "Functional equivalence between liquidity costs and the utility of money," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 271-291, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Carlos E. da Costa & Iván Werning, 2008. "On the Optimality of the Friedman Rule with Heterogeneous Agents and Nonlinear Income Taxation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(1), pages 82-112, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2005. "Heterogeneity, Redistribution, And The Friedman Rule," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 437-454, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Chris Edmond, 2002. "Self-Insurance, Social Insurance, and the Optimum Quantity of Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 141-147, May. [Downloadable!]
  15. Albanesi, Stefania, 2003. "Optimal and Time-Consistent Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 3713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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