This Paper studies the structure and time consistency of optimal monetary policy from a public finance perspective in an economy where agents differ in transaction patterns and asset holdings. I find that heterogeneity breaks the link between lack of government commitment and high inflation, which characterizes representative agent models of optimal fiscal and monetary policy. Even under commitment, it may be optimal to depart from Friedman’s rule for setting nominal interest rates. Moreover, optimal monetary and fiscal policies are time consistent. Time consistency does not require outstanding nominal claims on the government to be zero.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
3713.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Joseph H. Haslag & Joydeep Bhattacharya & Antoine Martin & Rajesh Singh, 2004.
"Who is Afraid of the Friedman Rule?,"
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Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph Haslag & Antoine Martin & Rajesh Singh, 2008.
"Who Is Afraid Of The Friedman Rule?,"
Economic Inquiry,
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Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2005.
"Heterogeneity, Redistribution, And The Friedman Rule,"
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