How Severe is the Time Inconsistency Problem in Monetary Policy?
AbstractWe analyze two monetary economies - a cash-credit good model and a limited participation model. In our models, monetary policy is made by a benevolent policymaker who cannot commit to future policies. We define and analyze Markov equilibrium in these economies. We show that there is no time inconsistency problem for a wide range of parameter values.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 8139.
Date of creation: Feb 2001
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Other versions of this item:
- Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2003. "How severe is the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 17-33.
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-02-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2001-02-27 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-MON-2001-02-27 (Monetary Economics)
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