Agency Behavior in a Nonprofit Setting: Effects of the 1984 Supreme Court NCAA Decision

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Agency Behavior in a Nonprofit Setting: Effects of the 1984 Supreme Court NCAA Decision

Author Info

Kathleen A. Carroll ()
Brad R. Humphreys ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Brad Humphreys

Abstract

The NCAA is commonly viewed as a cartel. We model the cartel relationship between the member teams and the NCAA central organization as a principal-agent relationship. Our model predicts imperfect agency behavior on the part of the NCAA with corresponding overregulation relative to the level preferred by the member teams. We empirically test the model by examining the impact of the 1984 Supreme Court decision that reassigned the telecast rights for intercollegiate football from the NCAA to the individual member teams. Our empirical estimates of telecasts, attendance, and competitive balance support the prediction of imperfect agency behavior by the NCAA.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by UMBC Department of Economics in its series UMBC Economics Department Working Papers with number 03-106.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:umb:econwp:03106

Contact details of provider:
Postal: UMBC Department of Economics 1000 Hilltop Circle Baltimore MD 21250, USA
Phone: 410-455-2160
Fax: 410-455-1054
Web page: http://www.umbc.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christelle Viauroux).

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-10-12 (All new papers)
NEP-SPO-2003-10-12 (Sports & Economics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Rodney Fort & James Quirk, 1995. "Cross-subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 1265-1299, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
E. Eckard, 1998. "The NCAA Cartel and Competitive Balance in College Football," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 347-369, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? LogEc provides statistical analysis about downloads from this service (and others).

This page was last updated on 2009-12-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.