IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ulb/ulbeco/2013-101648.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The timing of education

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Gall
  • Patrick Legros
  • Andrew Newman

Abstract

We study an assignment-with-investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before (ex ante system) and after (ex post system) matching on the labor market. The ex post system is better at coordinating investment within firms whereas the ex ante system is better at reducing mismatches. We further show that the ability to transfer surplus within firms affects mismatches and the relative performance of the two systems. At high degrees of transferability, they are equivalent. But when transferability is very low, the ex post system outperforms the ex ante system, although with moderate transferability the reverse is true. (JEL: I21, I28, J31, J42) (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Gall & Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2008. "The timing of education," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/101648, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/101648
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2017. "Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2041-2065, September.
    2. Chris Bidner, 2014. "A spillover‐based theory of credentialism," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(4), pages 1387-1425, November.
    3. Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2013. "Pricing and investments in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    4. Andrea, Canidio, 2009. "The production of science," MPRA Paper 25218, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Thomas Gall & Xiaocheng Hu & Michael Vlassopoulos, 2019. "Dynamic incentive effects of assignment mechanisms: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 687-712, November.
    6. Andrea, Canidio, 2010. "Absorptive capacity, the allocation of scientists, and firms' research productivity," MPRA Paper 30257, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Thomas Gall & Patrick Legros & Andrew Newman, 2015. "College Diversity and Investment Incentives," Working Papers 2015-001, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    8. Estache, Antonio & Foucart, Renaud, 2021. "On the political economy of industrial, labor and social reforms as complements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    9. Gall, Thomas & Hu, Xiaocheng & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2016. "Dynamic Incentive Effects of Team Formation: Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 10393, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. repec:stn:sotoec:360186 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Thomas Gall, 2017. "Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 51-78, March.
    12. Ryan D. Edwards, 2010. "Health, Income, and the Timing of Education Among Military Retirees," NBER Working Papers 15778, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Ryan D. Edwards, 2016. "Health, SES, and the timing of education among military retirees," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 393-410, August.
    14. Gall, Thomas & Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2012. "Mismatch, rematch, and investment," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 189, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/101648. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsulbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.