A Differential Game for Renewable Resource Extraction Asymmetric Players and Asynchronous Horizons
AbstractIn this paper we study a differential game, for resource extraction of a renewable good, in which players are overlapping generations of extractors. The framework of overlapping generation allows us to consider intragenerational (players in the same generation) and intergenerational (players in different generations) game equilibrium. We consider the case in which players, even if identical, face competition in an asymmetric way. Since we consider overlapping generations, players have asynchronous horizons, in contrast with a number of studies in intertemporal exploitation of resources in which players have identical time horizons.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia in its series Quaderni DSEMS with number lg_cart_2004.
Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Publication status: Published in Proceedings of I International Andean Conference and III Colombian Congress on Operation Research - CCIO 2004 - Cartagena de Indias, Colombia.
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Feedback Nash Equilibrium; resource extraction; overlapping generations; asynchronous horizon; asymmetric players.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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