The Use of Economics for Understanding Law: An Economist's View of the Cathedral
AbstractThis essay offers some observations, from the perspective of an economist, on the usefulness of economics for understanding law. Economic analysis provides a coherent theoretical framework for unifying different areas of law based on the pursuit of efficiency. It does this by recognizing common problems across different areas, which give rise to solutions that, while outwardly different, have the same underlying form. In this way, economics provides a theory of law. But economists can also learn a lot about how the economy functions by thinking more carefully about the role of law in facilitating economic activity. The success of law and economics ultimately resides in the recognition of this fundamental interrelationship between the two disciplines.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2011-25.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
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- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2012-01-03 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2012-01-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2012-01-03 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2012-01-03 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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