Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and investable premia in emerging markets
Abstract
We examine the interaction between the legal protection of investors, corporate governance within firms, institutional development between countries, and investable premia in emerging markets. In a multi country setting and using a novel dataset we find that better-governed firms experience significantly greater stock price increases upon equity market liberalization. We look to see whether well-governed firms in poorly governed countries enjoy an investability premium as measured by Tobin’s q. We find they do. Investors look beyond the seemingly weak country-level governance structures, and focus on corporate governance.Download Info
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Paper provided by Geary Institute, University College Dublin in its series Working Papers with number 201117.Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 22 Aug 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucd:wpaper:201117
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Keywords: Investability; Corporate Governance; Tobin's q; Emerging Markets;Other versions of this item:
- Thomas O'Connor & Stephen Kinsella & Vincent O’Sullivan, 2012. "Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and investable premia in emerging markets," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n229-12.pdf, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
- G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G19 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Other
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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