This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Local Power to Tax and Devolution: An Empirical Assessment of the French Constitutional Reform

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Alain Guenguant (CREM - CNRS)
Jean-Michel Josselin (CREM - CNRS)
Abstract

The article explores the content and consequences of the French constitutional reform of March 2003. Among the objectives of that reform, one is to preserve the tax autonomy for the local public sector; another is to ensure that the coming wave of devolution of competencies to decentralised levels of government will be adequately financed. These constitutional safeguards are assessed and they prove to be somewhat counterproductive, as if the recourse to the higher level of juridical norms could not replace the legislative level when reforms of local public finance, however difficult, have to be conducted.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2006/ie-200612.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) with number 200612.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:200612

Contact details of provider:
Postal: CREM - CNRS - Faculté des Sciences Économiques, 7 place Hoche, 35 065 RENNES Cedex
Phone: 02 23 23 35 09
Fax: (33) 2 23 23 35 09
Email:
Web page: http://crem.univ-rennes1.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: CREM - CNRS 7 place Hoche 35065 Rennes Cedex - France
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (SUIRE Raphaël).

Related research
Keywords: Central government; Constitutional reform; France; Local public sector; Local taxation; National grants.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. SALMON, Pierre, 1999. "Vertical competition in a unitary state," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1999-11, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
  2. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1981. "Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 152-65, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.