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Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk and the Behavior of Individual Preferences under Moral Hazard

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Author Info
Marcelo Bianconi

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Abstract

We consider the effect of alternative individual preference towards effort conditional on aggregate risk in a principal-agent relationship under moral hazard. We find that agents can explore a negative correlation between individual preference towards effort and aggregate risk to further diversify idiosyncratic risk and increase expected utility under moral hazard. The variation of individual preference towards effort may mitigate the impact of moral hazard on the risk premium, but we find this to be quantitatively small.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Tufts University in its series Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University with number 0410.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0410

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Related research
Keywords: moral hazard; disutility of effort; incomplete contract; meanvariance tradeoff;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing

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  1. Phelan, Christopher, 1994. "Incentives and Aggregate Shocks," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(4), pages 681-700, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marcelo Bianconi, 2003. "Private Information, Growth and Asset Prices with Stochastic Disturbances," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0301, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Deaton, Angus, 1991. "Saving and Liquidity Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1221-48, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Deaton, A. & Grosh, M., 1998. "Consumption," Papers 191, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
  6. Jewitt, Ian, 1988. "Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1177-90, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 115-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Pischke, Jorn-Steffen, 1995. "Individual Income, Incomplete Information, and Aggregate Consumption," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 805-40, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, 2002. "Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 798-817, September. [Downloadable!]
  12. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  13. Bianconi, Marcelo, 2001. "Heterogeneity, Efficiency and Asset Allocation with Endogenous Labor Supply: The Static Case," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 69(3), pages 253-68, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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