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Partial identification in matching models for the marriage market

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  • Gualdani, Cristina
  • Sinha, Shruti

Abstract

We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with perfectly transferable utilities. We do so without imposing parametric distributional as-sumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity and with data on one large market. We provide a tractable characterisation of the identified set under various classes of nonparametric distribu-tional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity. Using our methodology, we re-examine some of the relevant questions in the empirical literature on the marriage market, which have been previously studied under the Logit assumption. Our results reveal that many findings in the aforementioned literature are primarily driven by such parametric restrictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gualdani, Cristina & Sinha, Shruti, 2019. "Partial identification in matching models for the marriage market," TSE Working Papers 19-993, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2022.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:33016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    2. Jeremy T. Fox & Chenyu Yang & David H. Hsu, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1339-1373.
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    5. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2014. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(6), pages 1271-1319.
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    19. Sinha, Shruti, 2018. "Identification in One-to-One Matching Models with Nonparametric Unobservables," TSE Working Papers 18-897, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy Christensen & Benjamin Connault, 2023. "Counterfactual Sensitivity and Robustness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(1), pages 263-298, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    One-to-One Matching; Transfers; Stability; Partial Identification; Nonparametric Identification; Linear Programming;
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